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1. Introduction 
The rapid growth of the Internet uses all over the world, estimation from the statistics up to 
December, 2010 [1], found that there are 6,845 Million Internet users worldwide. However, it 
comes with problems about threats; especially the Distributed denial-of-service attack 
(DDoS) that make the victim cannot services as usual. This threat is one of the computer 
network security problems that attack the confidentiality, authentication, integrity, non-
repudiation, access control, and availability [2]. The major objective of these types of attack 
is to make the victim cannot access the resource or service the user as usual [3]. Those 
problem not only important for the security of the organizations network, but also can cause 
those organizations cannot connect to the Internet connection, especially if that organization 
having the transactions via the Internet, this will cause the huge effect that is hard to 
forecast. Moreover, nowadays there is still no method that can completely prevent or avoid 
those attacks [4]. IDS is defined as [5] the problem of identifying individuals who are using a 
computer system without authorization (i.e., ‘cracker’) and those who have legitimate access 
to the system but are abusing their privileges (i.e., the ‘insider threat’). For our work, we add 
to this definition the identification of attempts to use a computer system without 
authorization or to abuse existing privileges. Thus, intrusion is defined as “any set of actions 
that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of a resource”.  
IDS acts like the gate-keeper that has a duty to screen the people who come in and out the 
network. It will detect and block the intruder to access the network, therefore one of the 
objectives of IDS is to classify correctly between the real intrusion activity and the activity 
that similar to the intrusion but not the intrusion. Now, IDS is the software that detects, 
specifies, and reacts on the activities without the permission or the activities that are 
unusual on the target system. Various form of IDS are use as the main tool to detect and 
protect all of the computer system resources in the organization, may be the specific tool or 
the software that can install on the system that need to be protected.  
Furthermore, IDS is used as the major tool in the detecting and preventing the computer 
network resources in the organizations. So, IDS is the first target that the intruder will be 
attacked. I they can make IDS not convenient; all of the computer network resources have 
no prevention. However, as we cannot avoid the attack, the problem is how we can survive 
from the attack. For that, we must design the intrusion detection system that is based on the 
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basic of the architecture that is durable and can survive when there is an attack.  So, the 
research about the intrusion detection system architecture design which is durable is the 
challenge.  
The content in this paper divided into 7 sections. Firstly, the section is introduction. 
Secondly, the section is the related work. Thirdly, this section will explain about our 
architecture and model description. Fourthly, the section is architecture analysis. Fifthly, the 
section is analytical result. Sixthly, the section is our architecture proofing. And the last 
section is conclusion, recommendation and future work.  
2. Related work. 
The research in the field of the intrusion detection system that use the agent-based detection 
representative program technology can be separated to 3 levels, approach level [6], [7], [8], 
[9], [10], [11] implementation level [12], [13], and evaluation level [14], [15]. At present, the 
research about the technology of the Mobile Agent that uses the intrusion detection system 
is rapid growth. From our study the present IDS in the both of commercial and research, we 
found that most IDS use the architecture that has hierarchical structure that has both host-
based and network-based sensor, which collect the data, fundamental compile and pass on 
the result from the server that is the central analyzer. Here is the conclusion of the intrusion 
detection system main problem.   
Firstly, the single point of failure, the server that use for system analysis can found the 
single point of failure, if the intruder can make the server cause problem, slower or fail, for 
example, attack with DDoS. The system will have no protection.  
Secondly, the scalability problem, the architecture that compile with one computer make the 
system cannot be larger, because the analyzer unit that use to analyze the system will be 
limited with the size of the network that is detected. Moreover, the process that the server 
must handle the communication from many other hosts, this not only causes the heavy 
traffic on the network, but also leads to the bottleneck too.  
Thirdly, the difficulties of the adjusting of the configuration or ad the new abilities onto the 
components of the network, because mostly to the adjusting, correcting, and increasing the 
configuration, we must modify the configuration file, add or delete configuration file, or add 
new modules. These kinds of actions must restart the system, so the IDS can be used.  Even 
if the third problem had been solved by implementing the mobile agent technology in the 
IDS architecture, however, the first two problems still not solved indeed.   
In summary, the major problem of current IDS is not resistant to the attack of the IDS. This 
consequence from structural weaknesses of the lack of robust IDS that, lack of dynamic 
elements that can not escape the attack and lack of rapid backup and recovery mechanism. 
3. Overview of our proposed architecture 
This research goes to the effort to design the IDS architecture that is durable and survived 
after the attack. It is mainly use mobile agent technology to design and let IDS has more 
ability to the Distributed IDS.  
In this research, we interest in the architecture design that still has the detecting function and 
response to prevent the computer system resource, but durable from the attack and survived 
by using mobile agent technology with the network topology design. To deals with the ability 
to be the Survival architecture for IDS, the design will be based on the topics as bellow.  
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3.1 Survival architecture. 
Our conceptual framework to design for survival architecture based on highly available 
service of fault tolerant model which the model and description as the bellow. 
A. Highly available service of fault tolerant model. 
Our design concept based on highly available service of fault tolerant model. The 
framework for implementing highly available service by replicating data close to the points 
where group of clients need it. The replica manager exchange messages periodically in order 
to convey the update they have each received from clients. The service model provides two 
basic of operations: queries are read only operations and update modify but do not read the 
state. A key feature is that front ends send queries and updates to any replica manager they 
choose any that is available and can provide reasonable response time [18]. The system as 
shown in Fig. 1 make two guarantees, even though replica manager may be temporarily 
unable to communicate with one another, each client obtains a consistent service over time -
or- relaxed consistency between replicas. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Highly available service of fault tolerant model 
The highly available service is a fault tolerant model that ability of the system will continue 
to work in conditions that damage occurred. The goal of a durable system of corruption is 
preventing failure of the system as possible. There have key three properties [18]; fault 
avoidance, fault masking and fault tolerance. Fault Avoidance is a technique to avoid 
damage that may occur. Avoiding damage is in the form of IDS architectural design. We use 
this property as a separate architectural design system divided by the critical resources of 
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the network into three sections includes Critical asset, Proxy partition and region. The 
enterprise network perimeter by zoning to break the trust-host and untrust host separated 
to the mechanism used to secure appropriate. 
Fault Masking is the process to prevent fault that occur not to affect overall system 
performance. Our design of system architecture and network zoning this property to hide 
the fault of some of the elements and use the rapid backup and recovery mechanism to work 
instead. 
Fault Tolerance is the ability of the system will continue to work in conditions that damage 
occurred. The goal of a durable system of corruption is preventing failure of the system as 
possible. The architecture, we use several techniques designed to sustain damage, including 
fault detection, fault location, fault containment and fault recovery. These techniques can all 
work under the Mobile Agent technology. 
B. The Model Description 
To explain our basic replication model, how a model processes queries and update 
operations is as follows. 
Request: The front end (FE) normally sends request to only a single replica manager (RM) at 
a time. A front end will communicate with a different replica manager when the one it 
normally uses fails or becomes unreachable. It may try one or more others if the normal 
manager is heavily loaded. 
Update Response: If the request is an update then the replica manager replies as soon as it has 
received the update. 
Coordination: The replica manager that receives a request does not process it until it can 
apply the request according to the required ordering constraints. No other coordination 
between replica managers is involved. 
Execution: The replica manager executes the request. 
Query Response: If the request is a query then the replica manager replies at this point. 
Agreement: The replica managers update one another by exchanging the messages, which 
contain the most recent updates they have received. 
In order to control the ordering of operation processing, each front end keeps a vector 
timestamp that reflects the version of the latest data values accessed by the front end or the 
client. This timestamp (prev in Fig. 1) contains an entry for every replica manager. The front 
end sends it in every request message to a replica manager, together with a description of 
the query or update operation itself. When replica manager returns a value as a result of a 
query operation, it applies a new vector timestamp (new in Fig. 1). Since the replicas may 
have been updated since the last operation. Similarly, an update operation returns a vector 
timestamp (update id in Fig. 1) that is unique to the update. Each return timestamp is 
merged with the front end’s previous timestamp to record the version of the replicated data 
that has been observed by the client. 
3.2 System architecture 
Allocate all the network resources into parts as shown in Fig. 2. Each part will be composed 
of Critical asset, Proxy partition and region. In the Critical asset there is Critical host which 
include the important Application server and Critical IDS hosts. In Proxy partition, there are 
the proxy agents’ multicast groups and the intermediate layer hosts or network elements. 
The communication between this internal component and the communication with the 
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Critical asset has to use the high-speed transmission line or the network backbone that is 
hard to be attacked and region means the leaf LAN in the network. 
 
 
Fig. 2. System architecture 
Using Proxy partition concept that has the proxy agent as the medium for the 
communication between the components for hiding the major resources from the approach 
an attack directly, having shadow agent as the redundancy mechanism and the backup and 
recovery mechanism design, makes the system durable for the attack and can be survived. 
Proxy agent in the proxy partition is the multicast group that composed of the group 
members; each group will have the shadow agent as the mirror group communicates with 
other groups. The objective of this structure is to make the shadow agent, uses for 
preventing the proxy agent as shown in Fig. 3.  
Design the main components of the detection and response system is divided into groups, 
each group communicate by using the multicast group and asynchronous information 
transferring to reduce the amount of the information that are transferred in the network.   
3.3 Enterprise network perimeter by zoning 
The designs that will be divide all of organization’s network resources into separate parts, 
according to the separate design concept as shown in Fig.4. Define the region of the network 
to support both trusted-hosts and untrusted-hosts. The network will be dividing to 4 zones, 
external network zone, internal network zone, wireless zone and DMZ (Demilitarized zone), 
as shown in Fig. 4 and has monitoring zone with the use of the network topology that has 
NAT (Network Address Translation) technique to hide the network resources from the 
outsider.  
www.intechopen.com
 Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
46 
 
Fig. 3. Proxy agent and shadow agent 
Although designed for corporate network security, this is actually not new. But today, most 
organization’s network still does not focus much. They remain vulnerable to intruders use 
to attack at any time. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Enterprise network zoning with monitored zone 
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This idea has the objective to not being the target that can attack easily and from the 
attacking. It also and limit the damage when there is an attack. Therefore, these are 5 class of 
the attacker, the outside attacker that intruding via the Internet (class 1), the outside attacker 
who intrude via wireless segment (class 2), the internal attacker who intrude via the wired 
LAN (class 3), and the internal attacker that intrude via the wireless segment (class 4).   
This network consists of 4 monitoring zone, installing at the area that there is the inbound 
and outbound access of traffic, by using firewall as the tool to separate the network into 4 
zones in the physical level featured with;  
External network zone composed of the external firewall interface through the boundary 
router, and to the Internet. Internal network zone composed of the internal firewall 
interface, including every host that is connected until reach the internal switch.  
Wireless zone composed of devices and hosts that connect to the wireless. DMZ composed 
of firewall DMZ interface, including every host that is connected with DMZ switch. The 
separation of the network into zones will support good security framework, specifying 
about the rule and security policy that conform with the traffic from each zone clearly and 
concisely. This make the system can clearly monitor and detect the intrusion.   
3.4 Backup and recovery mechanism 
To ensure that the survival system, in case of the agent that is one of the components of this 
architecture stops its process, which might because the lost while transmitting, being 
attacked, or fail to communicate with other agents in the proper time limit.  It will suddenly 
resume perfectly, do not make others process in IDS being destroyed. This is because we 
design the rapid backup and recovery mechanism, it is the major part of this architecture 
because it is the protection using the agent system, and every agent will has more than 1 
agent backup as shown in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Agent Backup  
Backup agent will keeps all the information or some part of the agent that it is backup as 
shown in Fig. 6. The recovery process will (1) operational agent with 2 backup agents (2). 
When the original agent is corrupts. (3) Both backup agents will make a deal to choose the 
selected the successor. (4) When the successor is selected, it will create the new backup (5), 
agent that is broken discovers their ability, but the original agent will be terminated.  
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Fig. 6. Backup and recovery mechanism  
3.5 Security techniques 
To ensure the correctness of the message integrity, we make all of the communications in the 
components pass only the secured channel, by using the Public-key cryptography that is the 
Asymmetric scheme encryption and prevent the information by using HMAC (Hashed 
Message Authentication Code), which is the one component of the Digital signature. We do 
not need to encrypt overall document, but encrypt only with hash-value that received from 
the original document for the more execution speed and reduces the density of the 
transmission on the network.  
Moreover, the communication between the groups of the major components will force to 
communicate via the secure transmission channel, using the VPN (Virtual private network) 
technique. To reduce network congress ion, we design all communication between 
components using asymmetric multicasting group. 
4. Architecture analysis 
For considering whether our designed architecture can be survived or not, we will consider.  
4.1 Phase of compromise analysis 
If we want to detect the intrusion, we need to understand the actions to make the victim 
compromised from scanning, infiltrating, until the ability to control over the victim. There 
are 5 phases [17] to compromise a target, including (1) reconnaissance, (2) exploitation, (3) 
reinforcement, (4) consolidation, and (5) pillage.  Reconnaissance is the process to detect the 
connection and the number of hosts, the number and type of services, and examine the 
vulnerability of the application. Exploitation is the process that using those vulnerabilities in 
the wrong way, changing, or make the victim’s service unusable.  
Reinforcement is the step of trying to make strength of the intruder, by using the ability of it 
while infiltrating on the victim. Consolidation is the step that occur when the intruder 
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communicate to the server of the victim via the Back door and use the victim as the base to 
intercept the traffic of the communication between the server and the other host.  Pillage is 
the last step of the aim of the intruder; this may be stealing important data, attack the victim, 
or command to attack other system that is identified, using the victim as the base for 
attacking, terminating the process, destroying the resource, or spoil the target’s whole 
organization reputation. After understand the procedure and the activities of the attacking, 
we can design the intruder detection system to handle, detect, analyze, and response to the 
intrusion easily.  
4.2 Attack pattern analysis 
From the previous section, we can conclude the attacking pattern from the attacking model 
into 4 patterns, that are the external attacker that intruding through the Internet (class 1), the 
external attacker that intruding through the wireless network (class 2), the internal attacker 
that intruding through the wired LAN (class 3), and the internal attacker that intruding 
through the wireless network (class 4). Therefore, we can divide the intruder into two 
groups, the first group is the external intruder that intruding through the Internet and the 
wireless network, the second group is the internal intruder through the organization 
network and the wireless network, both group have the bad objective to the organization’s 
resources. However, with the architecture we designed in this research. Although we can 
see the channel (that comes from which route), the direction (of the attacking), and the 
intruder type (who, internal or external), but we cannot close these channels for forbid the 
intruder, because the usual user also use them. It is impossible that the organization do not 
allow their officers use the internet from the internal hosts.   So, we defined the way to 
access the network for getting to the resources certainly and limited. We divided the 
network resource into 4 zones, internal network zone, external network zone, wireless zone, 
and DMZ. Each zone has the certainly controlled in and out path, using firewall to control 
the flow of the inbound and outbound traffic, defined the 4 zones as the monitored zone  
and install the monitored host in each zone also. With our proposed architecture, we assume 
that there is no attacking type, by which channel, and by who can avoid the detecting of our 
system. Our system can certainly see the intrusion that occurs in any time and any where. 
Although this assumption does not guarantee that the intrusion detection system will 
oppose and survive if there is an attack, but we can find the conclusion in the next topic.  
4.3 Attack analysis  
We defined the attacking type into 4 types, that are (1) penetrate attack, (2) passive sniffing 
attack, (3) active probing attack, and (4) denial-of-service attack. As considering the 
sequence of the intrusion in the previous topic, usually the intruder will use type (2) and 
type (3) for the first phase of the attack to explore the target network, and then in phases 2-5, 
it will use type (1) and type (2) with the target victim. By considering those 4 attacking types 
with our designed system architecture, we can analyze the region that the intruder can 
attack into 3 partitions, which are the region, the proxy partition, and the critical asset 
partition.  
A. Region attacking 
Every host in the leaf region can be penetrated. If there hosts can be breaking through, the 
attacker can certainly use the same pattern to break through other host, for example, the 
attacker can use the port of the host that is made to listen to the passing packet of the 
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network that it goes through and enclosing the channel, so every other hosts in the network 
cannot be use. Moreover, it can use the active probing attack to attack the hosts in other region 
of the network. If there is the attacker that can break through large amount of hosts without 
detection, we can conclude that the intrusion detection system is unsafe. We propose the 
intruder detection system architecture that can continue function and the attacker cannot 
destroy the critical region that is the main resource of the host. Although the attacker can 
destroy some segment of the agent that work in this host, the attacker might correct the 
encoding of the agent for the bad objective. In this case, the backup mechanism for the agent 
that is in the leaf LAN still can recover the agent back and continue its function.  
B. Proxy partition attacking 
Although our proposed architecture can hide the important resources of the system invisible 
for the address and the real IP address by using NAT. This method can protect only Class 1 
and Class 2 attacking, but the attacker can know the location of the proxy agent while 
connecting with the leaf via the region agent. So, the proxy partition can be the target of the 
attacking. In our architecture, we will change the location of the proxy agent every time after 
finish each duty with the region agent, but if the attacker that know the location of those agent 
still can break through those host as in our assumption and if s/he is fast enough, s/he can 
control that host before the agent get off from the location.  In this case, proxy agent that is in 
the multicast group can be in the danger situation, because the attacker may destroy the agent 
or waiting in that host to sniff the traffic package of the network. With this method, the 
attacker will see the address of the shadowed agent; s/he may attack with the fourth method 
(DoS) on the multicast group until it is failed  or attack with the first method to break through 
the shadowed agent. By the reason that the members of the multicast group are distributed all 
over the infrastructure of the system, the attack that make the victim failed will not have an 
effect to all the network and cannot make the group of the left agent stop, and for the first 
method attacking, the attacker must be fast enough to break through the host that the 
shadowed agent is exist, because these agents can move its address at any time. The agents 
will randomly move all over the region, hard to be the still target for probing or penetrating. 
Under our assumption, the attacker will be detected before it will attack other target.   
For the proxy agent partition, the traffic analysis does not help the attacker to find the 
coordinator agent of the group, because the whole group communicates through the 
secured channel. So, it is not possible to sniff or analyze the traffic.   
For the shadowed agent, our proposed architecture allows to use the public key 
cryptography for the couple of the agent and the shadowed agent to guarantee the integrity 
of both of them. In this case, the traffic analysis also cannot be used. In case of both agents 
do not use the security mechanisms because of wanting to reduce the operating cost or 
reduce the traffic congestion, it is the cause that the attacker can find the group coordinator 
and attack that coordinator, making the system failed. However, the shadowed agent of the 
coordinator can be recovered the process of the system without stopped, and for the 
segment that do not have the agent, it is not possible to analyze the traffic definitely.  
C. Critical asset partition attacking  
With the property of survivability of our proposed architecture, it is hard to penetrate the 
critical section. Because we cannot use the sniffing or probing to get the communicating data 
between these critical agents and these critical agent is set up not to response other 
information types than the agreement.  The probing of the attacker is not useful, the attacker 
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may random critical host or uses the critical host’s IP address to attack the proxy agent and 
the shadowed agent simultaneously, after that uses the information to attack the critical host 
in the future. However, even if the critical agent is attacked, it can recover by using backup 
and recovery mechanism as presented.    
Therefore, we can say that the intrusion detection system in this architecture will not be 
shutdown whether it is attacked by any attacking pattern. It is truth that if the intrusion 
detection system cans still function, there is also the ability to detect the intrusion perfectly 
and countered that intrusion until it can get rid of it. The intrusion detection system in this 
architecture can recover its process by using backup and recovery mechanism.    
5. Analytical result 
By analytical result as the previous section, we can found the survival properties of our 
architecture. The survivability is the idea for continue designing the system that has ability to 
progress all of the missions, even there is an attack, objection, or situation [17]. The system that 
has the survivability must have 3 important characteristics that are the resistance, which is the 
ability to avoid the attack, the recognition, which is the ability to remember the attacking 
pattern and limit the damage, and the recovery, which is the ability to recover the important 
services during the attack and recover all the services after the attack.   
Using dynamic and sustainable components based on mobile agent technology and 
conceptual design framework based on fault tolerance model, leads to reduce the problem 
on single point of failure and emphasis fault tolerant properties. 
5.1 Resistance 
The designed Survival Architecture for Distributed Intrusion Detection using Mobile Agent 
has the main characteristics in the durability and avoid the attack by hiding the main 
components of the system by using proxy agent as the medium in the communication 
between components, together with using the network topology that separate network 
resources into zones, make the main components can move around the network by using 
the mobile agent and use the shadow agent reserved for every agents that have strong 
reserve mechanism.   
5.2 Recognition 
Survival Architecture can remember the attacking patterns, because it has the knowledge 
database that keeps the signature of the intrusion and the system that use the mobile agent 
can get rid of the damage when it was attacked.  
5.3 Recovery 
In case of some parts or every part failed, it can recover some of the processes or all of the 
processes by using the shadow agent together with the fast recovery.  
5.4 Single point of failure (SPoF) reduction 
The design that moves the Central directory server of all the components to the critical asset 
and do not allow the communication with other components directly via the Proxy partition 
will make the Central directory server hind effectively. The single point of failure problem 
also has been solved.  
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5.5 Fault avoidance 
Avoiding damage is in the form of IDS architectural design. We use this property as a 
separate architectural design system divided by the critical resources of the network into 
three sections includes Critical asset, Proxy partition and region. The enterprise network 
perimeter by zoning to break the trust-host and untrust host separated to the mechanism 
used to secure appropriate. 
5.6 Fault masking 
Our design of system architecture and network zoning this property to hide the fault of 
some of the elements and use the rapid backup and recovery mechanism to work instead. 
5.7 Fault tolerance  
The architecture, we use several techniques designed to sustain damage, including fault 
detection, fault location, fault containment and fault recovery. These techniques can all work 
under the Mobile Agent technology. 
6. Proofing 
For proofing that our proposed intrusion detection system architecture can be survived.  
Theorem:  
The architecture of the intrusion detection system using mobile agent that is proposed can 
be survived.   
Proof:  
In case of the attacker can attack only the region, proxy partition, and the critical asset 
partition as in above analysis. 
In bad condition, the attacking at the region might be the cause to make the agent at the leaf 
of the network failed, but can recover rapidly by using the agent in the proxy partition.   
In worst case, the intruder may penetrate the region to the agent in the proxy partition, 
having the possibility to attack the agent in the proxy partition until it is failed. But these 
agents still can recover by using the shadowed agent.  
In worst case, if the attacker can stop the operation of the proxy partition, and may be able 
to attack the critical agent later. Causing the malfunction in some sections of the critical 
agent, but those the critical agent still can be recovered by using the recovery mechanism.  
In worst case, since it is so little possibility, but if there is the possibility that there is the 
attacks partly malfunction the intrusion detection system, but those attack cannot destroy all 
of the intrusion detection system architecture, because we propose the strong and fast 
backup and recovery mechanism for each section of the architecture.    
Therefore, we have proven that the intrusion detection system architecture that is proposed 
can be survived even if it is attacked.  
7. Conclusion, recommendation and future work 
7.1 Conclusion 
The current research topics about the architecture for Distributed IDS using mobile agent 
technology is being growth both in approach level and implementation level, but the main 
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problem of the design that use this concept is  dIDS still has some mistakes, especially dIDS 
has no strength, it cannot deals with the big attack. Our research design the dIDS 
architecture is robust architecture improvement that is durable and can be survived by 
using the mobile agent technology with the network topology design, which allocate the 
resources into 4 separated parts, installs the monitored host onto each of network segment 
in order to resist the 5 class of the attacker and hides the main resource of the network 
behind the intrusion detection system. The design avoid the single point of failure, using 
shadow agent, together with proxy agent, fast backup and recovery mechanism, multicast 
group and the encryption of the communication between components of IDS. So, our 
architecture has the survivability that is resistance, recognition and recovery when there is 
the attacking from the intruder.  
Using dynamic and sustainable components based on mobile agent technology and 
conceptual design framework based on fault tolerance model, leads to reduce the problem 
on single point of failure and emphasis fault tolerant properties. 
7.2 Recommendation 
However, our designed architecture, have some main issues that is the interoperability and 
traffic congestion. Interoperability Because our architecture is  the distributed intrusion 
detection system (dIDS) that is able to detect the distributed intrusion detection system, one 
of the issue of this system is the limit of the interoperability, in case of working with other 
distributed intrusion detection systems, especially the real implementation, because the 
standard of each dIDS are not match with each other. This is the common problem of the 
researching and developing the distributed intruder detection system.  
Traffic congestion  
The concept of this designed architecture aim to the strength of the structure, able to handle 
any intruder, and survived from any pattern of the attack. Therefore, our architecture must 
be designed for having the secured communication route, using every security technique, by 
force every communication between components to pass only the secured channel. 
However, those security techniques will increase the operation cost and also can lead to the 
traffic congestion in the network.    
From this problem, we use HMAC as the security technique for contents integrity, this 
technique do not need to encrypt all the contents, we will encrypt only hash value that 
comes from the original for the velocity in the processing and specify to have the 
asynchronous communication via multicast group for reducing the traffic.    
However, for the cryptography that is used in every section of our architecture, we can 
consider to use Symmetric-key cryptography instead of the Public-key cryptography in 
some section to reduce the operation cost, having almost the same security standard. 
7.3 Future work 
We will work on implementation level using the model to evaluate the performance and 
proofing the model with survival analysis statistic on the next phase. 
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